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  FMD Emergency Vaccination Protocol,  
AMED, Defra 14 September 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•The Government will consider emergency vaccination 
as a disease control option from the start of any outbreak 
of FMD, on the basis of vaccinate to live, wherever 
possible. This is in line with the recommendations of the 
main FMD Inquiries. 
 
•The decision to adopt a particular control strategy will 
depend on a wide range of factors as indicated in the 
“Decision Tree”, many of which cannot be determined 
until we have knowledge of the nature and extent of an 
outbreak. Veterinary and scientific advice and judgement 
remain vital in determining disease control strategy. This 
will, in turn be dependent on the quality of information 
available. 
Decision tree UK 
2006 Foot and Mouth Disease Summit, October 2006 
As part of the presentation by the US CVO, John Clifford, the following sections appear:  
 
“RESPONSE GUIDELINES. The agency uses a decision tree to deter­mine when 
vaccination is appropriate and needed. Vaccination could be used in two ways to limit 
FMD spread: farms closest to the reported cases could be vaccinated, or a zone around 
the affected area could be vaccinated from the outside in”. 
  
“VACCINATION. Clifford also responded to questions about the federal government’s 
vaccination policy. USDA does not plan to vaccinate animals as a preventative measure 
against FMD. During an outbreak situation, vaccination only would be used as a firewall 
unless officials were unable to immediately contain and eradicate the disease; in which 
case, a vaccination control strategy would be implemented. According to Clifford, if the 
disease was contained and eradicated quickly, vaccinated animals would be destroyed so 
the United States could expedite its return to “FMD­free without vaccination” status. 
However, if the outbreak was widespread, the government would consider not 
destroying vaccinated animals”. 
Decision tree US a.o. 

The Dutch FMD Contingency Plan 
2004 
   Vaccination strategy FMD 
 
 I.      In the control of FMD, as few healthy animals as possible will 
be slaughtered and destroyed. 
  II.     In the first 72-hour standstill of an outbreak, vaccination will 
not take place. Animals at infected businesses, contact business and 
businesses within a radius of 1 kilometre of the infected business 
will be slaughtered and destroyed in this period.  
 III.     The Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality will 
decide whether, after the 72-hour standstill, vaccination will take 
place after consultation with an expert group. 
 IV.      At the same time it will be decided which areas will be 
subject to vaccination. 
  V.      If any outbreak occurs in a different area the decision of 
whether or not to vaccinate in that area will be taken again. 
 VI.      Vaccination is preventative vaccination for life. The animals 
will not be slaughtered after vaccination. 
 VII.     There is no special policy for hobby animals. 
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Decision tree Denmark 
  
Formålet med dette notat er at få fødevareministerens 
resolution til, at Danmark i tilfælde af et udbrud af mund- 
og klovesyge afventer beslutning om anvendelse af 
nødvaccination i op til 14 dage efter sygdommen er 
konstateret. I de første op til 14 dage anvendes alene en 
traditionel nedslagningsstrategi. I samme periode 
fremskaffes et bredt veterinærfagligt og økonomisk 
beslutningsgrundlag for den videre strategi. 
 
Fastlæggelse af bekæmpelsesstrategi ved udbrud af 
mund og klovesyge 
Institution: Fødevarestyrelsen   
Kontor/initialer: 1. kontor/BH/JAM 
Sagsnr./dok.nr.: 2009-20-24-00763 
Dato: 24. november 2010  
  
However, optimal control is also highly dependent upon animal density. 
The high number of pigs in Jutland means that animal density is much 
greater than in the UK. Infection therefore spreads rapidly in Jutland and 
ring culling is not sufficient to control spread for the vast 
majority of parameter space. 
In future, it would be interesting to extend the analysis of the Danish 
situation to look at a range of initial conditions prior to introduction of 
control and the resultant effect on optimal control strategies. 
The analysis for Denmark’s islands suggests that a uniform national 
control policy is not always the best strategy to control the disease. There 
is little threat of a major epidemic on Sjaelland and Fyn and a policy of ring 
culling can aid in controlling the disease and prevent spread to Jutland. 
Ring culling is not, however, a good strategy to employ in Jutland owing 
to the very high animal density. This suggests that a heterogeneous, 
responsive policy could be optimal for other farm demographies 
(including the UK), such that high risk regions are treated in a different 
way from low risk regions. 
Does EV work? 
• Effectiveness: 
 
• Is the size/duration of the epidemic 
smaller/shorter than with continued use 
of the basic scenario? 
 
• Efficiency: 
 
• Are the economic losses smaller than 
with continued use of the basic 
scenario?   
FAZD Center economists 
concluded: 
 
• Emergency vaccination 
reduces slaughter, but 
generally is not cost effective.  
 
• However, vaccination is a 
viable option if the goal is to 
reduce the risk of a 
catastrophic outcome. 
 
 
We quantified virus transmission in homogenous groups of vaccinated or 
non-vaccinated pigs in which the infection chain was started by exposure 
to a third group of non-vaccinated infected pigs. Transmission occurred 
to all contact-exposed pigs in the non-vaccinated groups and to 9 out of 
10 contact-exposed pigs in the vaccinated groups. The rate of 
transmission (β) was significantly reduced in the vaccine group. Yet, the 
estimated reproduction ratio in both groups was still above 1. 
 
In conclusion, by adjusting our transmission study design and challenge 
method, we were able to quantify transmission of FMDV among 
vaccinated pigs. According to this study a single vaccination was not 
sufficient to stop pig to pig virus transmission. With these results major 
outbreaks may still be expected, even in groups of vaccinated pigs. 
When to apply EV: 


While late detection may be a factor in the scale of an epidemic, it does 
not act in isolation. Rather than guaranteeing a large epidemic, late 
detection of FMD increases the probability of the occurrence of a large 
epidemic by extending the time period in which another event to 
augment the epidemic may occur. Such an event might be animals 
passing through a hub, the occurrence of climatic conditions suitable 
for windborne dispersal of the virus, or extensive local spread in an area 
of extremely high animal density. 
 
Based on this study, we can present a number of recommendations 
for consideration when developing contingency plans for an outbreak of 
FMD or other contagious foreign animal diseases. First, premises that 
act as hubs with respect to normal animal movement should be 
identified prior to an outbreak, and this information should be kept 
updated as animal movement patterns change. 
Where to apply EV: 
Reactive vaccination must be implemented on an appropriate 
geographical scale; in the case of a disseminated epidemic this will be 
regional or national – small scale ring vaccination may have 
limited impact. 
One possible strategy is to use vaccination as a complement to, 
rather than a replacement of, the culling of at-risk holdings, 
as in the Netherlands in 2001. For this strategy to be effective, it is 
important that implementation of the vaccination programme does not 
reduce the resources available to the culling programme, nor lower 
compliance with the culling programme. 
How to apply EV: 
 
Although the option of emergency vaccination is included in the EU 
contingency plans, the qualifying conditions for vaccination have not 
been finally determined. An EU working group has prepared a report on 
this issue [34] and potential amendments to the legislation have been 
proposed. However, none of these recommendations provide definitive 
guidance on the details of vaccination. It would be  problematical for 
guidelines to encompass all the circumstances that could arise, but it is 
important that most possibilities are considered.  
 
Ideally, a situation in which the decision to vaccinate was delayed until 
the vaccination area encompassed most of the country would be 
avoided. Indeed there is an opinion that emergency vaccine should be 
employed as a first, rather than a last, resort. 
• The choice of whether or not to apply emergency 
vaccination is probably the most difficult decision facing the 
authorities when disease breaks out in an erstwhile FMD 
free country. Effective computational models should be 
actively financed for a range of outbreak scenarios to assist 
objective decision-making and minimise bureaucratic 
delays in vaccine application. 
• Contingency planning should include provision for 
emergency vaccination and must address the complex 
decisions of not only when, where, and how to apply 
vaccine but also its economic consequences. Computer 
modelling may be a useful aid to cost benefit and decision 
support systems in this context. Planning must be detailed 
and regularly reviewed. 
Comparative Immunology, Microbiology 
& Infectious Diseases 25 (2002) 345–364 
• Countries that plan a stamping-out policy should also have a fall-back 
position. They should have a vaccination plan, which can be 
applied if the rate of FMD spread gets out of hand and outstrips the 
resources for stamping out.  
 
• A decision can be made later as to whether it is desirable 
to slaughter vaccinated animals to get a declaration of FMD 
freedom for trade purposes more quickly. 
 
• For most countries, large-scale stamping out is not a viable 
option. In these cases emphasis must be given to targeted vaccination 
campaigns, supported where possible by livestock movement 
controls and judicious stamping out.  
Geering & Lubroth, 2002 
• Lessons will, and must, continue to be learned. Perhaps the most important is that 
disease is unpredictable and whilst previous experiences and outbreaks may serve 
as a guide for actions in the future, no two outbreaks are the same and responses to 
them must remain flexible and adaptable. 
• Contingency planning includes identifying potential vaccination centres and their 
requirements, and updating instructions for running a campaign.  
 
• Experience shows that fixed trigger points for vaccination are difficult to define, due to 
the many variables involved in different outbreaks. 
• No contingency plan can ever be considered finalised or complete. A contingency 
plan is a living and constantly evolving document, a process to which the highest 
priority must be given. 
 
• A contingency plan must allow implementation of different components or 
procedures in particular instances in response to the situation at that time. Each 
outbreak is unique, so a flexible and adaptable approach is required. 
 
• The plan must be updated and amended to ensure that policy developments, 
operational experience, perceived risks and recommendations from all recognised 
authorities are reflected. 
Control of foot and mouth disease: 
lessons from the experience of the outbreak in 
Great Britain in 2001 
J.M. Scudamore & D.M. Harris 
Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 2002, 21 (3), 699-710 
 
 
Summary of emergency vaccination (EV) 
strategies in FMD contingency plans (CPs} 
 EU directive requires EV options in FMD contingency plans 
 
 Start FMD control with conventional culling of infected and in-
contact herds, zoning and movement bans 
 
 Intensions on the use of EV may be expressed in some CPs  
 
 If epidemic is expanding “out of control”, consider adding EV 
 
 Use a decision tool to prepare for when EV might be used  
 
 Need to specify: When? Where? How? 
 
 Actual decision depends on specifics of outbreak 
 
 
